Using a questionnaire and a sample of students and personnel managers we establish the existence of age discrimination in the hiring process in Germany and Norway. As expected, age discrimination is more prominent in Germany where the hiring probability of equally qualified applicants is reduced by about 22 percentage points due to an age differential of 14 years as opposed to only 12 percentage points in Norway. Within both countries the tendency to discriminate does not differ between students and personnel managers and does not depend on the age of the decision maker.
 [...] 
is characterized less by the risk of becoming unemployed than by the problem of remaining unemployed and failing to find new work."
Frerichs and Naegele (1998, p. 59) 
Introduction
In this article we present the results of a questionnaire study that we conducted to investigate whether applicants with same qualifications are treated differently in the selection process just on the grounds of age, and address age discrimination in hiring decisions in Germany and Norway.
Are there differences in age discrimination between the two countries, and if such differences exist, can we explain them?
Discrimination is a situation in which individuals identical in regard to their productive ability are treated differently because of certain of their nonproductive characteristics. In perfectly competitive labor markets discrimination cannot persist. Labor markets seem, however, to be monopsonistic (Manning, 2003) . The labor supply to the individual firm is not infinitely elastic. Workers have limited mobility and entry costs hinder other firms from competing for the labor pool in question. This imperfection in competition allows the monopsony to discriminate without being forced out of the market.
Age discrimination in labor markets is consequently defined as fewer opportunities of older workers not due to lower productivity but only due to their age (Cain, 1986) . Though age discrimination was already observed more than 50 years ago (see, e. g. Tuckman and Lorge, 1952) it is still one of the most difficult research questions to investigate in labor market research (Johnson and Neumark, 1997; OECD, 1998) . The reason is that it is difficult to establish whether differences between groups in relation to unemployment and wages are a result of discrimination, or of real differences in productivity or labor market ambitions. Incomplete contracts, hiring and training costs lead to an improved position of 'insiders' when it comes to rent sharing (see, e. g. Solow, 1985) . Wage differentials then no longer reflect productivity differentials alone.
Such measurement problems, the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals and firms, have lim- and classifications based on them harms many productive older workers (Neumark, 2001) .
A result of age discrimination is that older workers are often over-represented among the long-term unemployed, and have longer unemployment spells compared with their younger colleagues (Laczko and Phillipson, 1991; McDonald and Chen, 1993; OECD, 1998) . The employer might use the unemployment spell as a signal for lower productivity of the applicant pool as a whole. Such statistical discrimination can, of course, be totally rational, if the cost of testing the individuals exceeds the potential expected gains from finding the most productive individual.
In Germany, it has become more difficult to find a new job already from the age of 45 and onwards (Frerichs and Naegele, 1998) . Büsch, Dittrich and Königstein (2006) have shown that age discrimination in hiring decisions is rather common. The most-named reasons for the high proportion of long-term unemployed persons among older job seekers in Germany are perceived higher health risks and insufficient skills (Bogai, Hess, Schröder and Smid, 1994; Naegele, 1992) .
Furthermore, wage costs for older workers generally are considered to be too high because of the seniority principle in many wage systems, and the prospective employment period is seen to be too short. In Norway, the empirical evidence is much more anecdotal in character, and, as in most other countries, research on discrimination has focused on race and gender rather than on age. But, it has been found that age together with ethnic background, and long-term unemployment are the most important barriers for the unemployed in the labor market (Rogstad and Raaum, 1997) . A recent survey shows that 13 % of interviewed managers did not hire an applicant or promoted employees because of their age (Senter for Seniorpolitikk, 2002) .
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In the next section, we briefly review the relevant literature on age discrimination and position ourselves relative to the various perspectives. Then we describe institutional features of the two countries. This is followed by hypotheses concerning what we expect to find and a description of the sample(s) together with research methods. In the subsequent section, we comment on the results from our empirical analysis, and finally provide a conclusion and discussion in the last section.
4
F o r P e e r R e v i e w
Review of the literature
Economic research on discrimination tries to explain the different treatment of individuals on the grounds of their nonproductive characteristics. So far these were mainly gender or ethnic background.
There are, in principle, two approaches to explain discrimination. One is the taste-based approach of Becker (1957) . According to him, the different treatment results from the dislike of a person who belongs to a certain group. The other approach deals with statistical discrimination (see Phelps, 1972) . Here, Aigner and Cain (1977) distinguish between group discrimination and individual discrimination. Group discrimination occurs whenever the average remuneration of a group is not proportional to its average productivity. Individual discrimination happens as soon as workers with the same true abilities are not receiving the same wage (see Büsch, 2004, for further implications).
Consequently, empirical research on discrimination in the labor market has, for the most part, focused on race and gender wage differentials by estimating wage equations (see, e.g., Hinks, 2002; Ward, 2001) . In their recent overview of the mainly American literature, Altonji and Blank (1999) and Darity and Mason (1998) conclude that these differentials have been persistent over time, but that the nature and magnitude of the differences have changed. Yet, estimating wage equations posses serious problems. The problem of omitted variables, which invariably exists, leads to the conclusion that the obtained results always overestimate discrimination. If, on the other hand, discrimination has an impact on explanatory variables the obtained results may underestimate discrimination. Other research methods that try to overcome these problems and assess discrimination directly include paired-audit studies in which two applicants for a job are matched who differ only in one characteristic, such as race (for a summary presentation of relevant works, see Darity and Mason, 1998; Riach and Rich, 2002) , the comparison of productivity and wage differences (e. g. Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 1999; Kahn, 2000) , and, less common but increasingly popular, field (Harrison and List, 2004) Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Riach and Rich, 2004; Weichselbaumer, 2003) .
The empirical literature on age discrimination in the selection process is to a large degree dominated by psychologists. Empirical research has found mixed evidence for the role of applicant age in selection decisions. While some studies found a significant effect of the applicant's age, e.g., Rosen and Jerdee (1976b) and Avolio and Barrett (1987) , who show that younger applicants are evaluated more favorably than older applicants, others found little or no effect of age (Fusilier and Hitt, 1983; Locke-Connor and Walsh, 1980) .
There are several themes regarding age discrimination in the empirically oriented literature, and among these are negative stereotypes, employers' attitudes, employers' / interviewers' age, job type/status, and the recruitment process. Negative stereotyping is usually suggested as a reason for age discrimination (Perry and Bourhis, 1998) . Stereotypes in the relevant literature are typically defined as ". . . cognitive structures that consist of associations between attributes or features (e.g., personality traits, overt behaviors) and social categories (e.g., occupations, age)" (Perry and Bourhis, 1998, p. 1673) . When an individual is identified as a member of a social category, the attributes associated with this category are applied to this individual (Kalin and Hodgins, 1984) . Age stereotypes are defined by Rosen and Jerdee (1976a, p.180) as "widely held beliefs regarding the characteristics of persons in various age categories." Typically negative stereotypes of older workers are that they are less motivated, not up to date regarding their occupational skills, have a lower performance capacity, have less potential for development, are more risk averse, more resistant to change, and less creative (Maloney and Paul, 1989; Rosen and Jerdee, 1976a,b, 1977; Warr, 1994 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w characteristics such as age to "statistically discriminate" among workers.
Several studies of employers' attitudes toward older workers in the labor market indicate that older persons seeking work are heavily discriminated by employers (Itzin and Phillipson, 1993; Laczko and Phillipson, 1991; McEwan, 1990; Taylor and Walker, 1991; Walker and Taylor, 1993) .
Ginn and Arber (1996) found that 64 % of the women and 66 % of the men over the age of 40
reported that age was the most important barrier for getting a better job in Great Britain. Lewis and McLaverty (1991) found in a survey among managers and professionals aged 40 to 55 that 36 % reported age as being a barrier for internal promotion in their organization, and 45 % had not had any possibility for development during the last five years. Johnson and Neumark (1997) found that employees who reported age discrimination (self-reported -no promotion, demotion, laid off, not hired, etc. because of age) had a higher probability of leaving their employer and a lower probability of being employed (even if controlled for personal characteristics and other variables) than workers who did not report discrimination.
The age of the person conducting the job interview might also influence the hiring decision.
Perry, Kulik and Bourhis (1996) , based on their research, argue that those who evaluate older workers are strongly influenced by their attitude toward older persons in job selection processes.
A potentially greater number of years in the firm, "paper qualifications", and more adaptability are some of the reasons employers give for their preference for younger workers even though older workers are looked upon as more reliable. Many older workers felt that the only jobs that were available for them were part-time work and/or jobs with low wages (Taylor, 1998) . This can be exemplified by the study of Chiu and Ngan (1996) and Heywood, Ho and Wei (1999) both of whom studied older employees' possibilities on the labor market in Hong Kong. Among employers it is common to hire older persons only reluctantly, and age limits exist for a lot of jobs, especially for women. The suitable age for women is set lower than for men in spite of a higher life expectancy of women compared to men. Finkelstein and Burke (1998) find that the age of the managers have an effect on how they rated hypothetical applicants, and older managers are found to disfavor older workers. According to the authors this finding indicates that older people 7 Previous research and theory suggest that jobs have age norms or are age-typed (e.g., youngtyped, old-typed, or age-neutral) and that young applicants and employees will be evaluated more favorably for young-typed jobs, and vice versa for older applicants (Cleveland, Festa and Montgomery, 1988; Cleveland and Hollman, 1991; Cleveland and Landy, 1983, 1987; Gordon and Arvey, 1986; Perry and Bourhis, 1998; Perry et al., 1996) . The job status has also been found to be of importance, as old candidates are favored for low-status jobs and young candidates for higher-status jobs (Triandis, 1963) . Taylor and Walker (1994) find that age is an important factor in recruitment processes in such a way that several companies have official and unofficial upper age limits (see also Loretto, Duncan and White, 2000) . In advertisements of vacancies, age is often seen as a barrier for applying when an age interval is specified. Yet other information in job advertisements can also discriminate older job seekers as specifications of education, demands for qualifications, type of experience, etc. may convey that a younger person suits the job or company better than an older one (McGoldrick and Arrowsmith, 1992) .
Our study uses the method developed by Büsch et al. (2006) and differs from most of the studies cited above in the following aspects: First, in our questionnaire study we use four different age groups where age is randomized so that we have 24 different questionnaires and a total of 12 different age specifications for each of the three male applicants. The introduction of four different age groups improves the setting of other studies as the notion of being old varies with the occupation and can apply to a wide range, i. e. between 25-60 years (see Büsch, 2004 
Background information on Norway and Germany
Based on historical and institutional differences between countries, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) (Kohli, Rein and Guillemard, 1993) , and the employment management policies have been passive. The Nordic approach has been 'productivistic' in the way that the focus is on re-employment through retraining and reactivation programmes. The result is low levels of early retirement and high rates of participation in particular among women and older workers, and high average retirement age. Classifying countries according to their degree of labour market regulation Esping-Andersen (1999) argues that Norway has medium regulation while Germany has strong regulation. On the other hand the employment protection is considered by OECD (2004) as somewhat stricter in Norway than in Germany. Such differences make it interesting and relevant to compare the two countries, and below we will go more in detail describing differences between the countries which are good examples of social democratic and conservative welfare regimes.
The standard retirement age in Norway is 67 years, while the compulsory retirement age is 70. However, some professions and occupations have a lower retirement age, and law fixes some 9 persons are entitled to unemployment insurance for an extended period. Persons who become unemployed when they are 60.5 years old can receive unemployment benefits until they reach the standard pension age of 67 years. The most important non-public early retirement scheme in Norway is Avtalefestet pensjon (AFP, "Early Retirement Pension Agreement"). This scheme came into effect as from the 1st of January 1989. The pension age in the scheme has been gradually reduced over the years, and has been set at 62 as of 1st of March 1998. The replacement rate is different for the various types of retirement schemes. This may lead to different economic incentives for the retirement pathway that is used. As there is no public early retirement system, the above mentioned schemes have been extensively used by Norwegian companies and employees, especially disability pension and AFP (Dahl and Nesheim, 1998).
Our brief description of the German retirement system is focused on West Germany since, due to the transition, many temporary regulations were introduced. Even though the standard retirement age in Germany is 65, the actual retirement age is lower, i.e., on average around 60 in West Germany. One reason has been, and for a certain age group still is, the possibility to go into early retirement by the pathway of unemployment by the age of 58. Nowadays -due to the Social Security Reform of 1992 -only persons born before 1982 are still entitled to receive this kind of retirement pension. Since, in Germany, the social security system was still facing serious financial problems, a law was implemented in 1996, which prescribed a higher retirement age for older workers receiving unemployment benefits. In the same year, a partial retirement for older workers was introduced to give persons an incentive to postpone retirement. Another important pathway to retirement is the disability pension. In 1981, 68 % of male workers retired via this pathway (Börsch-Supan, 1998 (VDR, 2003 ).
An additional notable background feature for the comparison of the two countries is the unemployment and labor force participation rates of older workers. The unemployment rate directly influences the opportunity to discriminate in the hiring process. If there is no queue there is little room for discrimination.
Older workers in Norway have a lower unemployment rate than other age groups: 1.6 % for the 55-64 age group compared to 2.6 % for the 25-54 age group in 2001. This is one of the lowest unemployment rates in the age group 55 and older in all OECD countries. In 2004, 16.7 % of all unemployed aged 55+ had been out of work for more than one year. The corresponding percentage for unemployed aged 25-54 years is 7.7 %. The average length of an unemployment spell increases with age. For the oldest group it is 30.4 weeks. In contrast, the unemployment rate of older workers in the reunited Germany is almost the highest rate in the OECD countries.
In 2001 Finally, the dismissal protection laws that may also influence hiring decisions (see, e. g., OECD, 1999) are rather similar in both countries as the legal dismissal period increases with tenure from one month up to 6 month in Norway, and 7 month in Germany (see table 1 ).
However, the maximal dismissal period is age-dependent in Norway but not in Germany. Contrariwise, in Germany employers have to follow determined social criteria for redundancy that include among other things the age of the employee. These criteria are, however, not explicitly specified but are subject to firm internal negotiations. This aims to guarantee socially acceptable selection processes for redundancy. a Till the 15th or the end of the month. The legal dismissal period becomes only effective after six month of tenure. All other dismissal periods are till the end of the month.
Hypotheses and methods
In this section we set up our hypotheses and describe the methods used to generate the data.
Furthermore we explain briefly the concept of young, age-neutral and old job positions.
The above description of the situation of older workers shows that in Norway, there are a higher retirement age and a higher participation rate of older workers in the labor market. In
Norway the labor market situation in recent time has been stable and employees remain in their working positions. Older workers in Norway have a lower unemployment rate than other age groups. In Germany, however, the opposite is true. The unemployment rate is not only higher for older workers than for younger age groups but it is in general considerably higher.
Therefore, we expect that the degree of age discrimination will differ between the two countries with Norway being the country where the applicant's age has less influence on the hiring decision:
H 1 More age discrimination regarding the hiring decision will be observed in Germany than in Norway.
Since we also assess subjective expected productivity measures in our questionnaire study 12 we are able to identify and control for different age stereotypes in the two countries that may lead to statistical discrimination. Any discrimination that can not be explained by perceived productivity differences can be attributed to a dislike of older persons in the sense of Becker (1957) . Therefore, in line with our fist hypothesis, if there are any differences in the assessment of applicants' productivities:
H 2 The differences in the expected productivities between young, middle-aged, and older applicants will be larger in Germany than in Norway.
An alternative explanation for age dependent hiring probabilities is the prospective time to recoup human capital investments. The longer the prospective employment term the higher is the potential return on human capital investments. If this argument drives our subjects' decisions the disparity in hiring probabilities should increase with the average age of the applicant pool: Let the relative advantage of one applicant over another be defined as the ratio of the prospective employment terms. As we keep the age gap (14 years) in the applicant pool constant and only manipulate the average age, the relative advantage of the youngest over the oldest applicant in the group increases with the average age of the group.
H 3 The hiring probabilities depend on the age group of the whole applicant pool.
The higher the average age the less likely is the hiring of the oldest applicant.
As mentioned previously, we want to identify whether older applicants with the same qualifications are treated differently as compared to younger applicants. Since there is some evidence that certain jobs or positions have age norms, or are more appropriate for particular ages, it is important to identify an age-neutral position in a first step. By using an age-neutral position, we avoid identifying job discrimination, i. e. the job is seen as not suitable for the applicant (Perry et al., 1996) , instead of applicant discrimination.
One method to identify age-neutral positions was developed by Cleveland and Landy (1987) .
In their study, managers were asked to complete either a frequency grid questionnaire or a 13 graphic rating scale. In the frequency grid questionnaire, students had to express their subjective assessment regarding the age distribution in each job. They had to indicate how many of one hundred persons they thought were in each age category (<20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, >70) . In the graphic rating scale questionnaire, they had to state which of seven age categories (1=young, 2, 3, 4=middle-aged, 5, 6, 7=old) they thought would be predominant for the position in question. A job was defined as a younger person's position if 60 % of responses from each questionnaire type fell in the first three rating categories. A job was characterized as an older person's position if 60 % of the responses fell in the last four rating categories. And, a job was classified as age neutral if in each of the two questionnaires less than 60 % of the responses of both questionnaires were concentrated either in the first three or the last four response categories.
We used this method in a pre-study in both countries. In contrast to Cleveland and Landy (1987), we provided the participating students not only with job titles but they also received some background information of the respective positions: They were supplied with real job advertisements of 20 jobs selected from the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 1 . We concentrated on white-collar positions that are not physically demanding because there is some evidence in the literature that it is possible that physical strength decreases with age. Further, all vacancies were for permanent positions, since younger workers are overrepresented in fixed term positions (see, e. g. Schömann and Kruppe, 1994), and we want to avoid such unduly biases. In both countries we used the same descriptions of jobs and the corresponding companies.
In Norway, we made some minor adjustments to allow for a more representative picture. The adjustments concern only the largest companies since Norwegian companies are rather small on average. They have a smaller number of employees and lower annual turnovers.
After having identified a position that was age neutral both in Germany and Norway, we continued with the main questionnaire study. This consisted of four different tasks: In the introduction, students were asked to assume they were assistants of a personnel manager. The I  27  34  41  II  31  38  45  III  35  42  49  IV  39  46  53 managers were just asked to answer the questionnaire. Then they were given the description of the age-neutral position and the CVs of three hypothetical applicants. The first task was to state for twelve capability items -regarding different types of ability (see the appendix A.1.1) -weights (expressed in per cent) of the importance they attach to the criteria for filling the position. Second, they had to indicate on a 9-point bipolar rating scale, i. e. a discrete scale from one (extremely low) to nine (extremely high), how capable each applicant was with respect to all items. The third task was to mark the adequate wage level for each applicant. Participants were explicitly requested to use the wage level as a measure for productivity. In the questionnaire we also indicated the real wage range for this kind of position as a support. Last but not least, they had to decide whom of the three applicants they would hire given that all applicants would receive the same salary. Thus, the effects of the seniority principle in remuneration schemes should be ruled out.
In order to identify the degree of age discrimination in the hiring process the age of the applicants was the only systematically manipulated variable. We used four different age groups (see table 2 ). In total we had 24 distinct questionnaires since the various ages where assigned in all possible permutations within one age group to the three different applicants leading to 12 age specifications for each candidate.
The use of several age groups allows us to identify whether age discrimination is based on relative age within a group or whether it is also dependent on the absolute age. The age gap between the youngest and oldest applicant in each age group was only 14 years. Consequently, the applicant pool itself was characterized by a relatively homogeneous age structure. Compared 15 (1996) who described only two applicants with an age gap of 25 years to their subjects, an age gap of only 14 years is considerably less salient. This is important since in the questionnaire the real purpose of our study was hidden. Such knowledge obviously would affect the answers of the respondents, and most likely in a way that would reduce the study's potential for detecting age discrimination.
Empirical results
We ran the pre-study in Germany and Norway to make sure that the position used in the the main questionnaire study was seen as age neutral in both countries. In Norway, 28 and 26 students from the economics department at the University of Bergen, respectively, filled in the two questionnaires types. In Germany, 26 students of the economics and business department of the Humboldt-University of Berlin filled in the first and 35 the second questionnaire type.
In total, six positions in Norway and seven in Germany were identified as age neutral (see appendix, table 10 and 11). The overall evaluation of eight positions differed between Germany and Norway. In six of these eight cases, the answers differ in only one of the two questionnaires.
However, no job associated with young persons in Germany was seen as an old person's job in
Norway. The position used in the main study, Project-Engineer in Total Quality Management, was seen as age neutral in both countries.
In Norway, 91 students filled in the main questionnaire (35 female, 44 male, and 12 not reported), and in Germany 174 students (87 female, 78 male, and 9 not reported) participated.
The students were enrolled at the same departments as in the pre-study. But, no student partic- East Germany, we excluded this part of the country. We received 87 answers, yielding a response rate of 11 %.
In Norway, 45 male and 21 female managers and in Germany 58 male and 29 female managers filled out the main questionnaire. In Norway, the mean age of respondents was 47, in Germany it was only 40. This difference is significant according to a one-sided Wilcoxon test (p < 0.001).
A first result is that in the student sample wages for all three age types (young, middle-aged, old) did not differ much (see table 3 ). 2 This may indicate that they chose wages according to expected productivity as it was asked in the questionnaire. Personnel managers seemed, however, to rely on a seniority-base remuneration scheme. They offered to the oldest applicant a slightly higher wage than to the two younger applicants.
In order to calculate a measure for the perceived expected productivity, we multiply the percentage of how important the participants evaluated each of the twelve capability items by 2 The significant Kruskal-Wallis test result for Norwegian students is due to the high variance of wages for 'young' applicants. The means are not significantly different. the value they gave each applicant regarding the corresponding item. Expected productivity for all three age types is very similar in both countries. There is no significant pattern as one can see in table 4. This indicates that age stereotypes have at most only little influence on the overall productivity assessment in both countries and the students and personnel managers subsample.
Thus, we can exclude statistical discrimination as the main source of age discrimination in our study.
A closer look at the individual items (see tables 5 and 6) reveals that in Norway younger applicants received a significantly higher evaluation than older ones for only one item by the students (flexibility). German students, however, rated younger applicants significantly higher for two items (ability to learn and flexibility). Additionally, they assessed older applicants more highly in terms of organizational ability. While in Norway personnel managers did not show any significant pattern over all items, German managers evaluated in the same way as German students, i.e., they gave younger applicants a higher score for the items ability to learn and flexibility. So, there is some evidence that age stereotypes affect decisions in Germany but not or 18 (Agresti, 1990) . The test indicates that there is no association between hiring decisions and age groups when adjusted for country (χ 2 = 5.173, df = 6, p = 0.522). Consequently, any discriminating behavior applies in the same way to all age groups, i. e. age discrimination in our study is as severe in the applicant age group 27-41 as in the age group 39-53. We cannot support the hypothesis derived from the recouping human capital investments argument.
If the stated wage offer is a measure for productivity the hiring probability of the applicant with the highest wage offer should be higher than the corresponding unconditional hiring probabilities given that all applicants will obtain the same wage if they are hired. As table 8 shows, this can be confirmed. Additionally, this table reveals that by controlling for perceived productivity measured as (highest) wage rank age discrimination can be found in all subsamples. Though, it is less pronounced in Norway.
This already confirms our first hypothesis. But, so far we have not jointly controlled for perceived productivity differences measured as the weighted sum of individual capability item assessments and wage, the different vitas of the applicants, and the respondent's own age. To accomplish this task, we ran several random effects logit regressions on hiring decisions that are 21 Note, that we model the hiring decision not as a multinomial choice model since the alternatives are correlated and thus the crucial assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives is violated. We also do not rely on a nested logit model that can overcome this problem since some respondents chose not to hire only one but two applicants. We therefore rely on a random effects logit regression where the decision maker decides for each applicant whether he is hired or not.
By using this approach we control for the repeated measurement. Given the individual random effects, the residuals are uncorrelated. The estimated coefficients are consequently conditional on 22 
where i is the index over the respondents and j over the three applicants. For the regressions, we used the complete data set of all 418 questionnaires comprising German and Norwegian students and personnel managers. The first model already reveals that there is indeed age discrimination in our questionnaire data to be found: The coefficient of the variable Age Rank (coded 1, 2, 3 for youngest, middle-aged, oldest applicant) is significantly negative, indicating that older applicants have a lower probability of being hired. Furthermore, the subjective expected productivity has a significant positive influence on the hiring probability, i.e., the higher the subjectively perceived productivity of an applicant the higher is the hiring probability.
The same is true for wage that was supposed to be a measure for expected productivity, too. Since we observe that applicant "Koch" with everything else remaining constant is hired significantly less often, indicating that his vita is perceived as being inferior to that of the two other applicants, we also included an appropriate dummy variable to account for this (see also Büsch et al., 2006) .
Since one may have doubts whether the influence of Productivity Rank and Wage Rank on the hiring decision is linear a second model is estimated where dummy variables for each level of the two rank variables are included instead. Subsequently, we tested which dummy variables are significantly different from each other and from zero. By this procedure the set of variables that need to be included to account for perceived productivity differences is reduced. The resulting 23 One (two) star(s) indicate(s) significance at the 5 % (1 %) level. a The ranks are coded as 1 for lowest (youngest), 2 for middle (-aged), and 3 for highest (oldest). In case of ties the mid-rank is used.
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In model 3, we add a variable denoting a country and student interaction with Age Rank to assess differences between Germany and Norway and between students and personnel managers.
In general, we observe the same results as before but, strikingly, age discrimination is significantly less pronounced in Norway. This is indicated by the significantly negative coefficient of the variable Age Rank and the significantly positive coefficient of the interaction effect between Norway and Age Rank. Here Norway is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent is Norwegian. The total effect of Age Rank in the Norwegian subsample is still negative, but the size in absolute terms is significantly smaller than in the German subsample. There seems to be no significant difference between the student subsample and the personnel manager subsample. As is indicated by the nonsignificant coefficient of the interaction effect between Student and Age Rank, whereby
Student is a dummy that equals 1 if the participant is a student. Indeed, removing the Student variables improves the AIC slightly (down to 1050) which is then on par with model 2. 3 Since the residual deviance of this revised model 3 is, however, lower (1028) than that of model 2 it is preferred to model 2.
Finally, in model 4 we examine the influence of the participants' age group on discriminatory behavior. Since respondents in the Norwegian subsample are older than in the German subsample, this may drive the above result. We introduce five age groups. The first group of participants is aged 24 years and younger, the second is aged 25-34 years, the third is aged 35-44 years, the fourth is aged 45-54 years, and the fifth is aged 55 years and older. All age groups show the same discriminatory behavior as indicated by nonsignificant coefficients on the Age Group :
Age Rank variables. Including corresponding dummies for the Norwegian subsample yields no 3 The Akaike Information Criterion is a model selection criterion that discounts the model fit by the number of explanatory variables. A smaller AIC statistic is preferred. It selects the model with the best fit while still being parsimonious. To test for an influence of the four different age groups used in the questionnaire we introduce the appropriate interaction terms: age rank of the applicant within an age group and a dummy for each of three of the four different age groups. The remaining age group serves as the base condition. None of these interactions is significant at the 5 % level. This confirms the result of the earlier Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test. The age group of the applicants has no significant influence on the hiring decisions when we control for perceived productivity. Consequently, the prospective term of employment seems not be an issue here. A possible term of employment of 24 years (time until the oldest applicant in the youngest age group reaches the age of 65) does not lead to a higher hiring probability than a term of employment of 12 years (oldest applicant in the oldest age group).
To illustrate the different age-discriminatory behavior, we finally compute the conditional hiring probability of an applicant perceived as being the most productive according to expected productivity and offered wage, using the revised model 3. According to this, in Germany the youngest applicant is hired with a probability of 93.70 %, the middle-aged applicant with a probability of 85.78 %, and the oldest applicant with a probability of 71.00 %. 
Conclusion and discussion
The aim of this article has been to get a better understanding of the role of workers' age in the labor market. In contrast to many other studies regarding older workers this study has concentrated on the hiring process and not on promotions or the end of the career.
In a first step we have applied a method developed by Cleveland and Landy (1987) to identify an age-neutral job position. We improved their method by giving participants not only job titles for their evaluation but also actual job descriptions from a newspaper. Identifying an age-neutral job position was important to avoid the identification of job discrimination instead of applicant discrimination.
The main questionnaire consisted of an age-neutral job position including the job description and three short CVs, one for each applicant. In contrast to many other studies -mostly done by psychologists -age has not been a salient variable here. In our questionnaire we have four different age groups for the three applicants. The age gap between the youngest and the oldest applicant is always 14 years. In total we have 12 different age specifications for the same applicant.
As it is almost impossible to assess one individual's true productivity, as Börsch-Supan (2001) asserts, the perceived productivity of the candidate becomes an important determinant of the hiring decision. If the perceived productivity depends on non-productive characteristics of the candidate, as for example age, i. e. if the decision maker uses age stereotypes to adjust the individual assessment, he statistically discriminates the candidate. To identify statistical discrimination and control for it, the questionnaire also asks for the evaluation of twelve capability items and their relative importance for the position in question. Discrimination that cannot be explained by perceived productivity differences results from a dislike in the sense of Becker (1957).
Even though age has not been a salient parameter the older applicant has a significantly lower hiring probability than the younger one independent of the actual age group. Regarding the expected productivity the evaluation has not differed much with varying age. We can conclude 27 Germany and Norway. In Norway there is significantly less age discrimination. Additionally, we found no significant difference between students and personnel managers and no dependence on the respondent's own age. Therefore, the results are probably influenced by the different working situation of older workers in the two countries. Norway has less unemployment and a higher participation rate of older workers. Consequently, there is more experience with working with older workers in Norway. One could also suspect that different norms and the institutional design have been of importance for the results.
Anyhow, in Germany there is a strong tendency to discriminated against older workers in the hiring process. To meet the demographic challenges, it is necessary to reduce age discrimination. So that applicants with the same expected productivity are treated equally -regardless of their age. The reason for the "dislike" of older persons in Germany could be that, in contrast to Norway, an employee's age in Germany seems to be closely connected with hierarchical principles. In that case an employer in Germany might try to avoid hiring an older applicant for a low status position. Additionally, (though ruled out in our study) the seniority principle in remuneration schemes puts a higher price tag on an older employee's job performance. Changing these customs is only possible if the general norms of the society are altered -a very slow process that would last for some generations. Yet, when introducing a law against age discrimination, as it is required by the European Directive 78, the policy maker should exercise great caution as such a law can also have harmful effects. And, on the other hand, there is no clear evidence that suggests older workers are more likely to be hired as a result of such legislation (see Adams, 2004, for a study on age discrimination legislation and employment).
In this study, we have focused only on the demand side for 'old labor' . As the generosity of social welfare systems in Germany and Norway may also induce too high wage expectation of older workers given their productivity and as social benefits or early retirement pensions set a 28 F o r P e e r R e v i e w wage floor, alternative and complementary measures on the supply side that come to mind are for example wage subsidies for otherwise unemployed old workers, and a reduction of unemployment and early retirement benefits. Such measures are already implemented or are being discussed to be adopted in, e.g., France (see OECD, 2005) so that their effects can be studied in the near future.
Thinking about future research aspects one could vary the questionnaire in different ways.
Some adjustments like the following may be interesting. It could be worthwhile to find out whether the picture will change if age discrimination for a blue-collar instead of a white-collar position is investigated. Another point of interest could be to find out how the results change if -instead of an age-neutral position -an age-specific position is described. This questionnaire describes a hypothetical employment decision: In the enterprise of the XY group they have to decide whom they would hire and which wage the applicants should receive. On the next page you receive the description of the according job position and a short profile of the three applicants. Afterwards you are asked to evaluate the three applicants regarding 12 items as well as to make suggestions for the level of the salaries. Please do not forget to indicate whom you would hire.
The job description can be seen in the following job advertisement: Project Engineer in Total-Quality Management We are an enterprise of the group XY which is in the European market leader in the industrial metrology. 5700 employees in more than 50 high tech enterprises worldwide make a turnover of more than 1 billion Mark per year. Among our customers are top enterprises from telecommunication, satellite technology, medical technology and the automobile industry. In the area of circuits boards we are one of the best producers worldwide. Tasks:
• Extension and improvement of quality management • Management and implementation of quality improvement projects 1. Please weight the importance you attach to the criteria given below to fulfil the specific job requirements. Please indicate in the second column which weight you would give to these criteria. Please keep in mind that the sum of the percentages has to be 100. 2. Please evaluate now each applicant regarding the above mentioned items by making a cross (between "extremely low" (1) and "extremely high" (9)). Please use a separate table for each applicang and make sure that there is only one cross in each row. 3. Please indicate in table 5, which wage you would offer the candidate in the case he would be hired. The wage level should reflect your evaluation of the applicant's productivity. The typical wage in the sector -including benefits like Christmas bonus -lies between 38,000 ¤ and 46,000 ¤. Please take these limits into account for your answer. 
